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Replacing the gas tax with a road user fee would be more
equitable and a more stable source of funding for roads.
Better fuel economy and steady tax rates mean that by 2015 the federal Highway Trust Fund,
the primary source of road financing, will be facing a shortfall. A broad technical consensus on
the solution to this problem has emerged: the current gasoline tax should be replaced by a
road user fee based on the number of miles driven. Denvil Duncan and John D. Graham
accept this policy conclusion. They argue that with the advent of GPS and Internet connectivity
in cars, such a scheme is becoming more feasible, and would lead to more efficient travel
patterns, and offer a more stable revenue stream for road construction and maintenance.
Given recent regulatory changes in f ederal f uel-economy standards f or cars and trucks, the
consensus f orecast is that motor f uel taxes will not be an adequate source of  dedicated
f unding f or roadway maintenance and construction.  Many experts believe the f uel tax,
currently paid at the pump by all road users, should be replaced with a user f ee based on
the number of  miles driven. Although the road user f ee triggers privacy and cost concerns
that reduce its polit ical acceptability, it has several advantages over the f uel tax. It has the
capacity to generate substantial amounts of  revenue, can be used to inf luence driving
behavior in desirable ways, and its user-pay f eature makes it a more equitable means of  f inancing roads
than the gasoline tax.
The f ederal Highway Trust Fund, which is replenished by dedicated f unding f rom the f uel tax, is the primary
source of  f ederal f inancing f or roads. However, the f uel tax has grown increasingly inadequate due to a
combination of  higher f uel economy standards and the reluctance of  policy makers to change the tax rate,
as shown in Figure 1 below. Recent projections by the Congressional Budget Of f ice show that the Highway
Trust Fund will run a def icit in 2015. In f act, the Trust Fund would have been in def icit sooner had it not
been f or over $34 billion in transf ers f rom the General Fund since 2008.  One solution to this problem is to
replace the f uel tax with a road user f ee.  While our f ocus is the f ederal government, a similar case can be
made that the states should replace their gasoline taxes with road user f ees.
Figure 1: Trend in Highway Account Income, Outlays, and Balance : 1970-2005
Source: Authors’ calculat ions using Federal Highway Administrat ion and the Federal
Department of  Transportat ion highway stat ist ics data.
Note: All dollar values are reported in constant 2000 prices using the National Highway
Construct ion Cost Index.
A road user f ee charges each driver f or the number of  miles driven. The f ee structure can be modif ied to
account f or vehicle weight, which is known to be one of  the main determinants of  road wear and tear.
However, implementing a road user f ee f aces some challenges related to public acceptance and polit ical
support, and specif ic characteristics of  the program may inf luence acceptability.
First, how should vehicle miles traveled be measured?  One approach is to use the mileage recorded by the
odometer, which is a standard f eature in every motor vehicle. This inf ormation could be collected through
self -reporting by drivers or visual inspection by public servants. In order to discourage f raudulent reporting,
public servants could – f or a sample of  vehicles each year – compare reported mileage with an estimate
based on data f rom CARFAX vehicle history reports, insurance companies, auto service centers, and a
driver prof ile. The driver prof ile could be maintained by the taxing authority and include inf ormation that can
be used to predict mileage such as distance to place of  employment.
More technologically advanced methods are f easible but come with privacy and cost concerns that reduce
polit ical acceptability. Privacy concerns are especially relevant given recent revelations of  widespread spying
by the f ederal government. However, those worries may f ade as automakers build more cars with Internet
and GPS connectivity and more insurance companies adopt pay-as-you-drive policies. Theref ore, it may be
possible – within the next twenty years – f or the government to rely on the data collected by third-party
entit ies to implement the road user f ee. The most important f eature of  these developments is that they are
driven by demand and supply in the automotive industry. Theref ore, making this option available to drivers
on a voluntary basis should reduce privacy and cost concerns that have plagued the idea of  mandating new
GPS devices in all cars.
Replacing the gasoline tax with a mileage user- f ee has several advantages. First, the mileage user f ee
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provides a more adequate and stable source of  revenue f or the construction and maintenance of  roads.
This is due to the f act that the road user f ee does not depend on the amount of  gasoline consumed.
Theref ore, the amount of  revenues collected will not f all as the mileage ratings of  cars and trucks improve
over t ime.
Second, the mileage-based road user f ee is more equitable than the gasoline tax when judged on the
benefit principle. According to the benefit principle, a tax is equitable if  its burden is distributed proportionally
to the benef its received f rom goods/services f inanced by the tax. Since the gasoline tax is used f or road
maintenance, repairs and construction, one could argue that those who drive more and theref ore consume
more road services should pay more.  This f eature of  the gasoline tax is steadily being eroded by the rising
use of  f uel-ef f icient and all-electric vehicles. When a f ee is based on the number of  miles driven, it ensures
that each driver pays according to the amount of  road they “consume”. This is especially true if  the f ee
structure is adjusted f or vehicle weight.
Another distinctive f eature of  the
mileage user- f ee is its visibility to
drivers. Because drivers are billed f or
the number of  miles driven, it establishes a clear link between miles driven and user- f ee liability. This will
likely lead to more ef f iciency in travel patterns as drivers consolidate trips and car pool in order to reduce
their user- f ee liability. Although the road user f ee reduces the incentive to purchase f uel ef f icient cars
compared to the f uel tax, the environmental impact of  driving is best addressed with a tax on the amount of
pollution produced or on regulation of  tailpipe emissions.
Finally, a GPS-based mileage user- f ee also allows policy makers to address local traf f ic congestion.  A
surcharge could be implemented f or driving during peak hours in congested areas or driving on particular
bridges or expressways (similar to a toll).
There is never an easy time to propose a new tax, even one that replaces an existing tax with a user f ee.
Fortunately, the ongoing f iscal debates in Congress may lead eventually to comprehensive tax ref orm. 
Such a bill could include the replacement of  the f uel tax with a mileage user- f ee. Failure to address the
looming def icits of  the Highway Trust Fund will have ominous consequences:  more unrepaired roads, more
bumper-to-bumper traf f ic and larger f ederal def icits as the Federal government continues to supplement
the Highway Trust Fund with transf ers f rom the general f und.
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